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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal comes from the summary judgment order issued by the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, Provo Department, dated January 22, 2008. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(a)(j). 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Whether or not discovery has revealed disputed and material facts to support 
Plaintiffs claims against Utah County Government. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This case arises out of a dispute concerning the denial of Plaintiff s insurance 
claim on his ex-wife's dependent life insurance policy. Plaintiff claims that he is entitled 
to the life insurance proceeds as the former husband of the named insured, Sherrie 
Ellison. Plaintiffs basis for this claim is that he was not informed by a certain, 
unidentified Utah County government employee and Hartford Insurance representatives 
concerning the status of the dependent life insurance policy when he got divorced and the 
implications for his role as the beneficiary. 
The material facts are largely undisputed in this case. At all relevant times, 
Plaintiff was a full-time employee of Utah County. As a benefit of his employment, he 
qualified to have life insurance on his dependents, including his wife at the time, Sherrie 
Ellison. Plaintiff elected to take out a dependent life insurance policy for his wife and the 
payments were made via deductions from his paycheck. Plaintiff and Ms. Ellison 
divorced in late August, 2003 and the deductions continued to be withdrawn from his 
paycheck until shortly after Ms. Ellison's death in late October, 2003. 
Approximately a year before his divorce and his ex-wife's death, Plaintiff claims 
to have spoken with an unknown and unidentified Utah County employee in the hall of 
the Utah County Government building. Plaintiff claims that this unidentified County 
employee informed him that his soon-to-be, ex-wife could continue to have dependent life 
insurance coverage as long as he continued to pay the premiums, which he could confirm 
with the insurance carrier, Hartford. Plaintiff claims that he followed up with Hartford 
and received confirmation that an ex-spouse could continue to have life insurance 
coverage if the premiums were paid. 
Approximately a week after her death, Plaintiff made a claim against Ms. Ellison's 
dependent life insurance policy. Plaintiffs claim was denied because, after the divorce, 
Ms. Ellison no longer qualified as a dependent under the definition in the policy. 
Moreover, his claim was denied because Ms. Ellison, as the named insured, did not go 
through the conversion process for her dependent policy to ensure Plaintiffs continuation 
as beneficiary. 
After an unsuccessful appeal of the denial of his claim, Plaintiff filed a civil action 
against Utah County government for the alleged oral misrepresentations made by this 
unknown and unidentified County employee with respect to keeping a former spouse as a 
dependent in a supplemental dependent life insurance policy. The trial court granted Utah 
County's motion for summary judgment in a respects for lack of evidence. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Plaintiff began full-time employment with Utah County in July 1995. See 
Deposition of Val Ellison ("Ellison Dep.") at p. 7, Record p. 375. 
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2. As a benefit of his employment, Utah County provided life insurance to 
Plaintiff as well as supplemental life insurance coverage for his dependents, including his 
then-wife Sherrie Ellison. Complaint ^ 1 1 , Record p. 10. 
3. At that time, Plaintiff elected to purchase a dependent life insurance policy 
in the amount of $200,000 in the name of Sherrie Ellison. Id. at f 12. 
4. Plaintiff paid the premiums on Ms. Ellison's supplemental dependent life 
insurance policy with automatic deductions from his paycheck. Id. at |^ 14 
5. Ms. Ellison was diagnosed with terminal pancreatic cancer in 2001. Id. at f 
15. 
6. Plaintiff and Ms. Ellison, represented by respective counsel, filed for 
divorce and this Court subsequently entered a ten-page Decree of Divorce on August 21, 
2003. See Decree of Divorce, Record pp. 451-461. 
7. The divorce decree ordered Plaintiff to provide health and dental insurance 
for their minor children and be responsible for the premiums and costs to maintain such 
insurance. Id at p. 6, *f 8, Record p. 456. 
8. The decree also ordered that Ms. Ellison "be entitled to obtain health 
insurance under the COBRA Plan" through his employment with Utah County. Id. at f 9. 
9. With respect to life insurance, the decree also stated that "[i]t is reasonable 
and proper [for Plaintiff] to maintain a life insurance policy on his life as available 
through his place of employment at reasonable cost during the children's minority with as 
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much coverage as possible, with the children as the sole beneficiaries and Wells Fargo 
Bank designated as the trustee." IcL at p. 10,118, Record p. 452. 
10. Nothing in the Decree of Divorce speaks to obtaining or maintaining a life 
insurance policy on Ms. Ellison's life, nor the designation of beneficiaries for any life 
insurance on her. Id 
11. Ms. Ellison died on October 27, 2003. Complaint f 19, Record p. 9. 
12. In anticipation of their divorce, but unsure as to the exact time frame, 
Plaintiff claims to have spoken with an unknown and unidentified employee of the 
"County's Human Resources Department" sometime at "the end of 2001, beginning of 
2002", or "end of 2002, beginning 2003," to "continu[e] his insurance policy on his 
terminally ill ex-wife after the divorce." See Complaint ^ 17, Record p. 9; see also, 
Ellison Dep., pp. 17-18, 51, Record pp. 364-365, 331. 
13. Prior to their divorce, Plaintiff informed Ms. Ellison of the supplemental 
dependent life insurance policy on her name through his employment. See Ellison Dep., 
pp. 58-59, Record pp. 323-24. 
14. Unsure as to the dates, Plaintiff alleges that this unknown and unidentified 
employee of Utah County's Personnel office informed him that Ms. Ellison's dependent 
life insurance coverage would continue after their divorce as long as he continued to pay 
the premiums, but that he should confirm with the insurance carrier, Hartford. Id. at p. 
18, Record p. 364. 
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15. Plaintiff alleges that nobody from Utah County government informed him at 
any time of a required procedure to convert Ms. Ellison's dependent life insurance policy 
after their divorce. IdL 
16. After his divorce, but before Ms. Ellison's death, Plaintiff was informed by 
Laura Hammish, a county Personnel department employee, that leaving Ms. Ellison on his 
health insurance would constitute insurance fraud. IcL at pp. 66-68, Record pp. 314-16; 
see also 09/16/2003 E-mail, Record p. 447. 
17. Plaintiff also testified that he spoke with Peggy Poulsen, Utah County's 
benefits specialist, "two or three" times concerning a claim for Ms. Ellison's dependent 
life insurance. See Ellison Dep., p. 33, Record p. 349. 
18. Approximately one week after Ms. Ellison's death, Plaintiff e-mailed 
several Personnel office employees, including Peggy Poulsen, asking if anyone 
remembered a conversation "about continuing life insurance on my wife even if we got 
divorced." See 11/16/06 e-mail, Record p. 447. 
19. Ms. Poulsen replied that she "[did] not recall having a conversation with 
[Plaintiff] on anything other than COBRA (which continues health and dental insurance) 
and the QDRO for retirement issues" and that she "was not even aware [Plaintiff] had a 
life insurance policy on [Ms. Ellison]." IcL 
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20. Ms. Poulsen explained in her responsive e-mail to Plaintiff that, as a 
divorcee herself, she was "quite certain" that she "would not have told [Plaintiff] Sherrie 
could stay on any of [his] policies once [he was] divorced." Id. 
21. She also informed Plaintiff that she could not recall any county employee 
making a life insurance claim on an ex-spouse and having been paid. She mentioned that 
she was confident that she would remember such an occurrence because there were not a 
lot of life insurance claims handled by the Personnel office. Id 
22. After Ms. Ellison's death, Ms. Poulsen informed Plaintiff that he "couldn't 
file a claim, [because] Sherrie was no longer a dependent." See Ellison Dep., at p. 34, 
Record p. 348. 
23. Concerning the conversion of a dependent life insurance policy, Ms. 
Poulsen testified as follows: 
Q. What's your understanding of who would have to fill out that 
form in order for supplemental life insurance to be provided 
to an ex-spouse? 
A. It's my understanding that the person losing the coverage 
because they've lost their dependent status needs to request 
the form and complete it. 
See Deposition of Peggy Poulsen ("Poulsen Dep."), p. 57, Record 443. 
24. Ms. Poulsen also explained the employee's responsibility, if he decided to 
continue insurance coverage for a spouse after divorce: "[T]he employee needed to tell 
the spouse they no longer had dependent coverage, and needed to contact the Hartford to 
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do a conversion, or to contact Personnel to find out the proper procedure." IcL at 26, 
Record p. 444. 
25. Ms. Poulsen also testified that the employee "need[ed] to provide a copy of 
the divorce decree within 30 days and apply for a conversion policy." Id. at 75, Record p. 
438. 
26. Ms. Poulsen also explained that she did not know that Plaintiff "at any time 
ever provide[d] Utah County with any written documentation from his ex-spouse that 
indicated that his ex-spouse wanted to continue life insurance." Id. at p. 58, Record p. 
442. 
27. Ms. Poulsen was not aware "of any communication in any form from 
Sherrie Ellison at any time which informed Utah County that Sherrie Ellison wanted to 
continue supplemental life insurance after her divorce to Mr. Ellison." Id 
28. Had Plaintiff informed Ms. Poulsen about dependent life insurance for an 
ex-spouse, she "would have informed him that the ex-spouse needed to contact Personnel 
for conversion information, and would apply for conversion through Hartford." Id. at p. 
61, Record p. 441. 
29. Copies of the Hartford policy and information packets, which included 
termination information and information on conversion of a life insurance policy after it 
terminates, where made available to all employees, which included Plaintiff. Id at pp. 
33, 59-60, Record 188, 162-161. Ms. Poulsen testified that Utah County held a mandatory 
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Benefits Fair each year in which ample information from each insurance carrier was 
provided and available to Utah County employees. Id. at 19-22, Record 199-202. 
Hartford in particular had a booth, and a representative named Tori at the Benefits Fair in 
2002. Id at 18:16-25, Record p. 203. 
30. Prior to the death of Plaintiff s ex-wife, Utah County did not receive a 
request indicating that Ms. Ellison intended to continue her life insurance through 
Hartford or needed to convert the dependent life insurance policy. IcL at 73^74, Record 
pp. 440-439. 
31. When asked to produce evidence that his ex-wife would have completed 
and signed a conversion form to continue supplemental life insurance on her, and that she 
would have named Plaintiff as the sole beneficiary, Plaintiff clearly testified that he does 
not have "any written evidence" and only supposed and assumed that he is "quite sure she 
would have" designated him as the beneficiary simply from "just knowing her." Ellison 
Dep., pp. 93-94, Record pp. 289-88. There is no other testimony supporting this 
assumption regarding Ms. Ellison's disposition. 
32. "Dependent" is a defined term under the Hartford life insurance policy. 
The policy contract defines it as being "Your spouse" and "Your unmarried children." 
See Hartford Memo. p. 4. Record p. 406 (Ex. 2 at 38.). 
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33. The policy contract provided that dependent coverage ends on the date 
when "the Dependent no longer meets the definition of Dependent." Id, In this case, it 
ended on August 21, 2003-the date this Court entered its Decree of Divorce. 
34. Under the "conversion provision5' of the dependent life insurance policy, 
the named insured, Ms. Ellison, "must, within 31 days of the date group coverage 
terminates, make written application to Us and pay the premium for his age and class of 
risk." id. 
ARGUMENT 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that judgment "shall be 
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Emphasis 
added.) All inferences that reasonably can be drawn from the facts should be drawn in 
favor of the nonmoving party. See Ho v. Jim's Enter., Inc., 29 P.3d 633, 634 (Utah 2001); 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The party opposing summary 
judgment has the duty to "set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for 
trial." DLB Collection Trust by Helgesen & Waterfall v. Harris, 893 P.2d 593 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995) (quoting Utah R.Civ.P. 56(e)). "[BJare contentions unsupported by any 
specification of facts in support thereof, raise no material questions of fact as will 
preclude entry of summary judgment." Massey v. Utah Power & Light, 609 P.2d 937, 
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938 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added). Moreover, a party opposing summary judgment must 
do so with admissible evidence. Gary Porter Constr. v. Fox Constr., Inc., 101 P.3d 371, 
377 (Utah App. 2004) (emphasis added). 
In the present case, there are no disputed issues of material fact, indeed, there are 
very few disputed facts at all. The few facts that are disputed, are not material to the 
claims and allegations raised by Plaintiff or they are merely bare contentions, unsupported 
by the evidence. Because there are no genuine issues of material fact, the trial court could 
and did appropriately render judgment as a matter of law on all of Plaintiff s claims. 
The primary purpose of summary judgment "is to pierce the allegations of the 
pleadings, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, although an issue may be 
raised by the pleadings, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law." Dupler v.Yates. 351 P.2d 624, 629 (Utah 1960). The aim of a motion for 
summary judgment is also to determine whether the "controversy can be settled as a 
matter of law, that will save the time, trouble and expense of a trial." Rich v. McGovern. 
551 P.2d 1266, 1268 (Utah 1976). 
POINT I. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO ESTABLISH A NEGLIGENCE CLAIM 
FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE OF PRIMA FACIE ELEMENTS. 
To prevail in a negligence claim, a plaintiff has the burden of proving four 
elements: duty, breach of duty, causation and damages. See Rocky Mountain Thrift 
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Stores v. Salt Lake City Corp., 887 P.2d 848, 851 (Utah 1994). Plaintiff cannot provide 
enough evidence to establish these elements at trial. 
A. Utah County Does Not Owe Plaintiff a Duty in this Matter. 
"It is axiomatic that one may not be liable to another in tort absent a duty." 
Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 765-66 (Utah 1987). A duty of care is "an 
essential element of a negligence claim." Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 
1989). "Duty is a question of whether the defendant is under any obligation for the 
benefit of a particular plaintiff and determining if such duty exists is "entirely a question 
of law to be determined by the court." Ferree v. State. 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). 
In the present case, extensive discovery has failed to produce any evidence 
substantiating Plaintiffs negligence claim because there is no evidence supporting 
Plaintiffs allegations that Utah County owed him a duty. Plaintiff asserts that Utah 
County government owed him a legal duty to instruct him on how and when to convert a 
supplemental dependent life insurance policy. In so doing, Plaintiffs negligence claim 
asserts a heretofore, unknown legal duty owed by an employer to its employee with 
respect to providing complete and accurate information about his benefits, such as a life 
insurance policy at issue in this case. In other words, Plaintiff asked the trial court to 
create a common law duty by Utah County to, not only make a Hartford representative 
and information packet available to him at a job fair, but to affirmatively del ail and 
communicate the process by which his potential ex-wife may convert her dependent life 
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insurance policy after divorce. No such duty exists under Utah law and should not be 
created under the facts of this case. 
In Larson v. Wycoff Company, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed summary 
judgment for an employer who was sued after its employee was denied life insurance 
benefits for his deceased son. See, 624 P.2d 1151 (Utah 1981). In Larson, the plaintiff 
began working for Wycoff Co. as a part-time dock worker. Although he did not initially 
receive benefits, Larson eventually became a full-time employee and obtained benefits 
that included life insurance and dependent life insurance coverage. Id. at 1153. In 
addition to his own policy, Larson obtained a $2,000 dependent life insurance policy on 
his son. Id. 
Approximately one year later, Larson transferred to a different position with 
Wycoff and his hours were reduced to 25-30 per week. Id. The reduction in hours meant 
that Larson no longer qualified for benefits under the terms of the policy, which stated 
that "all active, full-time employees may be included in the company's group benefit plan 
the first of the month following completion of thirty (30) days of service, provided they 
complete an enrollment card as required by the personnel office and they are working as 
full-time employees 40 or more hours per week." Id Because Larson was no longer 
employed full-time, the insurance carrier denied his claim for benefits. Larson sued his 
employer claiming they had breached a duty to inform him that his benefits had been 
terminated. See id. 
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In affirming summary judgment for the employer, the Utah Supreme Court relied 
upon the general proposition that an employer need not give notice of a policy lapsing "in 
the absence of a policy provision or statute requiring notice." IdL at 1154 (quoting 
American Western Life Ins. Co. v. Hooker. 622 P.2d 775 (Utah 1980)). The Utah 
Supreme Court reasoned that Larson was on notice of the terms of the insurance contract, 
so his employer could not be held liable. See id 
For the same reasons as those elucidated in Larson, the Court should"affirm 
summary judgment in favor of Utah County in the present case. The Hartford policy 
governed the relationship between Hartford and Plaintiff, and Plaintiff knew or should 
have known that, "[u]nless continued in accordance with the Exception to Termination 
section, a covered Dependent's insurance will terminate on the earliest of: . . . the date 
you are no longer eligible for dependent coverage [or] the date the dependent no longer 
meets the definition meets the definition of dependents." Likewise, there is no policy 
provision or statute requiring notice of the termination of the dependant life insurance 
policy in this matter. 
Under the definition section of the insuring contract, a dependent is defined as 
6tyour spouse." On August 21, 2003, when Ms. Ellison divorced her husband, she was no 
longer his spouse and no longer his dependent. As in Larson, Plaintiff was adequately 
informed of the termination provisions of the insurance coverage, and therefore he was 
responsible for determining his own insurance needs and providing for them when his 
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circumstances changed. Plaintiffs bare allegations that he stopped some unknown 
employee of the County to talk about a continuation of his soon to be ex-wife's life 
insurance is not enough to create a duty in this case. 
Because there is no principle of common law, no policy provision and no statute 
that required Utah County to give Plaintiff notice that Ms. Ellison's dependent life 
insurance coverage terminated when she no longer qualified as a dependent, Plaintiffs 
negligence claim against Utah County fails as a matter of law for a lack of duty. 
B. There is no Evidence that Utah County Breached any Duty. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that Utah County owed a duty to maintain 
complete and orderly files with respect to employee fringe benefits and to affirmatively 
inform Plaintiff of how to convert a dependent life insurance policy, the documentary 
evidence and deposition testimony fail to show how Utah County breached this duty. 
Plaintiffs own testimony clearly shows that he was told to confirm the status of 
life insurance coverage for his soon-to-be ex-wife with the insurance carrier, Hartford. 
Therefore, any duty that Plaintiff alleges was owed him by Utah County, was fulfilled in 
referring Plaintiff to the insurance carrier for verification and for further instructions as to 
how to convert and continue to insure his soon-to-be ex-wife. 
Furthermore, holding Utah County liable because it referred Plaintiff to Hartford 
or did not inform him regarding the necessity of converting the policy or continue to 
insure his ex-wife would essentially mean that Plaintiff did not have a personal 
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responsibility to educate himself with the insurance policy and any conversion process. It 
is undisputed that Utah County held a benefits fair every year and that Hartford had a 
booth with all the information about their policy available in 2002. The County made 
information and copies of the policy, including the conversion provision, available to 
Plaintiff. It was the plaintiffs responsibility to read and understand his own policy and 
Plaintiff should be held responsible for his own lackadaisical approach to ensuring the 
dependant life insurance continued when he knew that his wife was terminally ill and 
knew that they would soon be divorced. Indeed, considering these facts, Plaintiff is in a 
better position than anyone regarding his need to learn about that process for ensuring the 
dependent policy's continuation after his divorce.1 
C Utah County's Actions Did not Cause Plaintiffs Injury. 
With respect to the prima facie element of causation, "an essential element in a 
negligence action is that the plaintiff establish the necessary connection between the 
defendant's negligence and the plaintiffs injury." Weber v. Springville City, 725 P.2d 
1360, 1367 (Utah 1986). The Utah Supreme Court explained in detail: 
A plaintiff s inability to establish evidence of factual cause is fatal to his or her 
negligence claim. The classic formulation for determining factual cause is that 
a defendant's negligent act or omission must be a necessary antecedent to the 
plaintiffs injury. . . . The plaintiff must introduce evidence which affords a 
1
 There is no evidence that Utah County personnel knew that Plaintiffs wife was 
ill prior to his divorce. Indeed, Plaintiff cannot testify that he ever fully informed anyone 
at Utah County of the extent of his wife's illness. (See Ellison Dep. pp. 106-108; Record 
pp. 276-274.) 
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reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the 
conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the result. A mere possibility 
of such, causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure 
speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it 
becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant. 
Id 
Assuming, for the purpose of a Motion for Summary Judgment only, that Utah 
County in fact owed a legal duty to Plaintiff in this matter, the documentary evidence and 
deposition testimony fail to establish how the comments of an unknown and.unidentified 
Utah County employee, that Ms. Ellison's life could continue to be insured as Plaintiffs 
dependent after their divorce, was the proximate cause of Plaintiff s alleged damages. As 
the Supreme Court explained in Weber, Utah County's negligent act or omission must be 
a necessary antecedent to the denial of Plaintiff s claim for the dependent life insurance 
policy on his former wife. In this case, there is a complete lack of evidence in support of 
the causal connection between the comments by the mystery Utah County employee and 
the denial of the claim. 
Without this evidentiary support, Plaintiffs only recourse to prove causation by a 
series of assumptions, speculations, and personal belief. First, he asks the court to assume 
that he would have disregarded the mis-information he allegedly got from Hartford about 
continuing his ex-wife's policy and demanded a conversion form despite the fact that they 
told him he did not need one. Second, he asks the court to assume that his wife would 
have elected to convert her dependent life insurance policy and then name him as the 
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beneficiary after their divorce; despite any evidence to support that she would have done 
so. Third, he asks the court to believe that Hartford would have approved the claim and 
he would have received the $200,000 from the policy. Clearly, Plaintiffs speculation 
about the way things would have happened and his rank conjecture of his ex-wife's intent 
is insufficient evidence to conclude that Plaintiff was damaged as a result of Utah 
County's actions. 
In light of the foregoing, judgment as a matter of law is warranted in this case 
because Plaintiff fails to establish the prima facie elements of negligence. Namely, he 
fails to establish any alleged legal obligation owed by Utah County to him, breach of the 
alleged duty, and proof of a causal connection between the denial of his claim and the 
statements of an unknown Utah County employee that as long as he kept paying the 
premiums after divorce, he would receive the proceeds of the dependent life insurance 
after his wife's death. 
POINT II. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT HAS 
NO SUPPORT IN THE FACTS OR THE LAW. 
"The elements of a prima facie case for breach of contract are (1) a contract, (2) 
performance by the party seeking performance, (3) breach of the contract by the other 
party, and (4) damages." Bair v. Axiom Design. LLC, 20 P.3d 388, 392 (Utah 2001). 
Plaintiff claims that his employment contract was breached by Utah County when 
an unidentified county employee allegedly informed him that the dependent life insurance 
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policy on the name of his soon-to-be ex-wife would continue as long as the premiums 
were paid. Plaintiff further claims that the breach of contract occurred when he was 
allegedly not informed of the procedure to convert the life insurance policy on his 
dependent spouse after the divorce. Plaintiffs claim for breach of contract fails as a 
matter of law because he cannot establish and prove the essential elements of the claim. 
In the first instance, Plaintiff has not produced a written contract between his 
employer, Utah County, that would detail the scope of the contractual relationship. 
However, even assuming that Plaintiff is relying on a common law, at-will employment 
relationship as the underlying contract in his claim, he merely raises the allegation that 
Utah County was contractually obligated to him to communicate or provide information 
concerning fringe benefits, including supplemental life insurance on his dependents. 
Absent evidence of a written contract, or an oral contract, Plaintiff cannot prove the first 
element of a prima facie claim for breach of contract-an actual contract. 
The minor disputes over whether Utah County handed Plaintiff a copy of the 
policy or simply made it available at the annual job fair and whether the mystery 
employee told him about necessity of conversion after his divorce are immaterial because 
Plaintiff has not produced a contract indicating that such action or inaction would be a 
breach. 
Plaintiff alleges that Utah County failed to perform its part of the employment 
agreement, yet he can only produce his own bare allegations that the erroneous, out-of-
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court comments of an unknown and unidentified employee concerning the status of his 
soon-to-be ex-wife's dependent life insurance was a breach of the employment contract. 
Plaintiff claims that he was misinformed by the mystery Personnel employee and that he 
relied on the oral representations made to him prior to divorcing and prior to the death of 
Ms. Ellison. However, Plaintiff fails to provide any information regarding the identity of 
the employee, asking this Court only to take his word at face value that her actions were a 
breach of the contract. Therefore, not only is there no proof of an actual coritract, there is 
no evidentiary support for the performance of either party. 
Plaintiffs breach of contract also fails because he has failed to produce evidence 
in support of his damages. Breach of contract damages are necessary to place the 
aggrieved party in the same economic position the party would have been in if the 
contract was not breached. See Mahmood v. Ross, 990 P.2d 933, 937 (Utah 1999). 
The Utah Supreme Court has offered the following explanation concerning 
damages arising out of a breach of contract claim: 
Typically, there are two types of damages a non-breaching party can recover 
in an action for breach of contract: "general damages, which flow naturally 
from the breach, and consequential damages, which, while not an invariable 
result of breach, were reasonably foreseeable by the parties at the time the 
contract was entered into." Id. (citing Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 
795, 801 (Utah 1985)). 
To recover consequential damages, a non-breaching party must prove (1) 
that consequential damages were caused by the contract breach; (2) that 
consequential damages ought to be allowed because they were foreseeable 
at the time the parties contracted; and (3) the amount of consequential 
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damages within a reasonable certainty. 
Mahmood, 990 P.2d at 937-38. In Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 466 
(Utah 1996), the Court ruled that consequential damages are limited to those reasonably 
foreseeable or contemplated by the parties when contract was entered into. 
Assuming, only for the purposes of this appeal, that Plaintiff has evidentiary 
support of an employment contract, Plaintiff fails to show any general or consequential 
damages resulting from the alleged breach of the contract by Utah County. It is well-
established that the purpose of breach of contract damages is to place the plaintiff in an 
economic position that he would have been in had the breach not occurred. 
Plaintiff cannot prove general damages because no evidence exists that he incurred 
any damages as a result of his reliance on the comments of an unknown Utah County 
employee on an unknown date. Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to $200,000 for the life 
of his ex-wife after they divorced because his claim was denied by Hartford due to Ms. 
Ellison's failure to convert the dependent life insurance policy after their divorce. 
However, Plaintiff does not provide any evidence that Ms. Ellison's failure to convert the 
policy was due to the comments of the unidentified personnel employee-the court is to 
simply assume that she would have converted it had Plaintiff been told about the 
conversion by the personnel employee. 
Regardless, Plaintiff was advised by the employee that he should confirm with the 
insurance company what steps must be taken to change the status of a dependent policy 
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after he and his spouse divorced. Thus, the onus was on the plaintiff to educate himself 
and arrange his own affairs in anticipation of his divorce; the same way he did for his 
own health, dental, and life insurance and for the benefit of his minor children in the 
divorce decree. Plaintiff cannot show that he would have asked his wife to convert the 
policy (despite the information given him by Hartford), that she indeed would have 
converted it and that Hartford would have processed and paid the claim. 
With regard to the recovery of consequential damages, Plaintiff fails to prove that 
his alleged consequential damages were caused by the breach of his employment contract 
by Utah County. Specifically, Plaintiff fails to establish that he incurred any 
consequential damages because no such damages were foreseeable at the inception of his 
employment in 1995. As the court explained in Mahmood, to recover consequential 
damages, the plaintiff must prove "that consequential damages ought to be allowed 
because they were foreseeable at the time the parties contracted." 990 P.2d at 938. 
Because the damages were not reasonably foreseeable or contemplated by Plaintiff and/or 
Utah County in 1995, Plaintiffs claim for breach of contract fails as a matter of law. 
POINT III. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF FRAUD 
ON THE PART OF UTAH COUNTY GOVERNMENT. 
Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "in all averments of 
fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with 
particularity." In Taylor v. Gasor, 607 P.2d 293, 294-95 (Utah 1990), the Supreme Court 
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noted the following: 
A finding of fraud must be based on the existence of all its essential elements, 
i.e., the making of a false representation concerning a presently existing 
material fact which the representor either knew to be false or made recklessly 
without sufficient knowledge, or the omission of a material fact when there is 
a duty to disclose, for the purpose of inducing action on the part of the other 
party, with actual, justifiable reliance resulting in damage to that party. . . . As 
stated in Lundstrom v. Radio Corporation of America, 405 P.2d 339, 341 
(1965), "fraud is a wrong of such nature that it must be shown by clear and 
convincing proof and will not lie in mere suspicion or innuendo." 
Accordingly, the law requires that averments of fraud be pled with particularity. See id. 
In this case, Plaintiffs fraud claim fails for lack of evidentiary support. 
Specifically, Plaintiff has failed to establish the identity of the Utah County Personnel 
employee whom he claims misinformed him; Plaintiff has failed to establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that the oral representations made by this mystery personnel 
employee were actually made; and Plaintiff cannot show that the (unidentified) 
misrepresentor knew the comments she made were false and/or reckless. Absent more 
specific or concrete evidence supporting these essential elements of fraud, Plaintiffs 
claim for fraud fails as a matter of law. 
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Plaintiffs allegations are true 
and he was told by Utah County that his es-wife's life insurance would continue if he 
simply paid his premiums, he admits to also being informed by the mystery employee to 
confirm the information directly with the insurance carrier, Hartford. This fact is critical 
because it shows that there was no intent to deceive Plaintiff and that the comments were 
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not recklessly made; the mystery employee told Plaintiff what she believed to be the truth, 
but advised him to confirm her comments with the insurance carrier.2 Therefore, under 
Plaintiffs version of the facts, there still can be no fraud. 
Plaintiff spends many pages of his appeal brief arguing that whether he acted with 
reasonable diligence or reasonably relied upon the representations by Utah County are 
questions of fact. While that may or may not be true, it is wholly irrelevant in this matter 
because Plaintiff has failed to show that a representation was actually made^a 
requirement under Utah law. See Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 
21 P.3d 198, 207-08 (Utah 2001). Because Plaintiff relies solely on his own 
unsubstantiated testimony that a Utah County employee made an erroneous comment 
about the conversion of his wife's supplemental dependent life insurance policy, he 
cannot show by clear and convincing evidence that the statement upon which he bases his 
fraud claim was actually made and cannot succeed at trial. 
2It is worth noting that a Divorce Decree was entered after deliberations and 
negotiations between each parties' legal counsel. The Divorce Decree is specific in the 
obligations and responsibilities of each party with respect to the allocation of assets and 
debts, visitation rights, and including several provisions concerning insurance. In 
particular, the Divorce Decree is detailed and explicit with respect to Plaintiffs 
responsibility to have health and dental coverage for the minor children as well as to 
insure his own life through his employment. Noticeably absent however, is any 
information concerning a life insurance policy on Ms. Ellison. A detailed divorce decree, 
negotiated with the assistance of counsel, would also have mentioned Ms. Ellison's 
dependent life insurance policy and her intent to leave Plaintiff as the beneficiary if there 
was indeed such an agreement. 
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Discovery has failed to produce any evidence that the statement was made in the 
first place, but even if the statement was made, no evidence exists as to who made it. 
Without knowledge of, or the ability to establish, the identity of the person Plaintiff 
blames for misinforming him, plaintiff cannot prove to a jury the comment was made. 
Simply stated, Plaintiffs allegations must be substantiated by the evidence, and none has 
been produced and discovered in this case. See Winter v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 820 
P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 1991) ("allegations of a pleading or factual conclusion of an affidavit 
are insufficient to raise a general issue of fact."). 
To establish a fraud claim, Franco also requires a misrepresentation to be made 
with "insufficient knowledge upon which to base such representation," which Plaintiff 
also fails to prove with clear and convincing evidence. Id. In particular, plaintiff testified 
that was informed by the mystery county personnel employee to contact the insurance 
company "to make sure or to have any other questions answered." (Ellison Dep., p. 106; 
Record p. 276.) Clearly, plaintiff was referred to Hartford for substantiation and 
clarification. Therefore, Plaintiffs own testimony shows that the county employee did 
not have an intent to deceive or made her comment with insufficient knowledge, rather 
referred him to the insurance company for clarification and confirmation. Plaintiff acted 
on the statement and called Hartford, who allegedly informed him that as long as 
premiums were paid, his wife's life would be covered after the divorce. Thus, any 
alleged damage plaintiff incurred was not the result of any actions or statements by the 
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county employee. 
Considering the undisputed evidence, plaintiff fails to establish a cause of action 
for fraud against Utah County because he admittedly has no clear and convincing 
evidence he can present to the jury to support his claim. 
POINT IV. PLAINTIFF LACKS STANDING TO SUE FOR THE 
DEPENDENT LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS. 
"As a general rule, a person can sustain a cause of action only where he has 
sustained some injury to his legal, personal or property rights, the injury and the cause of 
action being contemporaneous." Havmond v. Bonneville Billing & Collections, Inc., 89 
P.3d 171, 173 (Utah 2004). In order to determine if a plaintiff has standing 1o sue, courts 
"first apply traditional standing criteria, which require that (a) the interests of the parties 
be adverse, and (b) the parties seeking relief have a legally protectable interest in the 
controversy. Plaintiff must be able to show that he has suffered some distinct and 
palpable injury that gives him a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute." 
Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451, 454 (Utah 1985). 
Plaintiff has no standing to sue because he cannot demonstrate that he suffered a 
"distinct and palpable injury" by Utah County from the denial of the insurance claim by 
Hartford. Plaintiff has not, and cannot, prove that, had his late ex-wife opted to convert 
the policy and done the conversion process, he would have been named the beneficiary. 
Indeed, the only evidence offered by Plaintiff to show that his ex-wife would have named 
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him as the named beneficiary, is his testimony that she would, "just knowing her." This 
pure speculation is clearly insufficient evidence of Ms. Ellison's intent.3 
Further, in order for Plaintiff to have standing to sue for the proceeds of Ms. 
Ellison's life insurance policy, he needs to claim a property right to that policy. It is 
undisputed that Ms. Ellison's dependent life insurance policy lapsed on August 21, 2003 
when the Decree of Divorce was entered by this Court. On that date, Ms. Ellison's policy 
lapsed, and Plaintiffs property rights as a beneficiary ceased, thereby terminating any 
3Plaintiff may claim that an alleged conversation with his wife, in which she told 
him to use the life insurance proceeds for the kids' "missions and schooling and so forth" 
(see Record; p. 287), is evidence of her intent to convert the policy and name him as the 
beneficiary. However, this assertion is without merit for two reasons. First, it is not 
evidence of an intent that Ms. Ellison, had she been given the chance after their divorce, 
would have simply named him as the beneficiary to do with the money as he saw fit. 
Second, this conversation is clearly hearsay. This statement does not fall under the 
804(b)(2) "imminent death" exception because there is no evidence that death was 
imminent. Before a proponent may offer hearsay under the dying declaration exception, 
sufficient evidence must be laid that the declarant had a sense of impending death. See 
e.g. United States v. Lawrence, 349 F.3d 109, 117 (3rd Cir. 2003). 
Moreover, it is not excepted from hearsay as a statement against interest under 
Utah Rule of Evidence, 804(b)(3) because it does not fulfill the elements. A statement 
against interest is a "statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the 
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to 
civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that 
a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless 
believing it to be true." Even a "statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal 
liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating 
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement." Ms. Ellision 
allegedly made these comments while she was still married to Plaintiff (see Ellison Dep. 
p. 95; Record p. 287) when she first got ill and it was not "so far contrary" to her 
pecuniary or proprietary interest at that time. 
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right for Plaintiff to claim the insurance proceeds. In other words, when Ms. Ellison 
(through divorce) failed to be defined as Plaintiffs dependent according to the definitions 
of the policy contract and Plaintiffs rights terminated along with Ms. Ellison's insurance 
coverage. As a result of this change in status as the beneficiary, Plaintiff lacks the 
necessary standing to sue and collect Ms. Ellison's life insurance proceeds. In other 
words, Plaintiff did not sustain an injury to his legal or property rights because none 
existed when this court entered the Decree of Divorce and effectively terminated the 
marriage and any dependent status. 
Lastly, Plaintiff fails to show that he suffered a distinct and palpable injury as a 
result of Hartford's denial of his claim because, again, he cannot show that, had his ex-
wife elected to convert the policy she would have named him, her ex-husband, as the sole 
beneficiary. Plaintiff cannot escape the fact that his claims are founded on the pure 
assumption that Ms. Ellison would have opted to give him the proceeds over her adult 
children or a trustee as the beneficiary for all the children, including the minors, as it was 
done in the Divorce Decree. (See Decree of Divorce, f 18; Record p. 111.) The trial 
court was warranted in refusing to "take his word for it" that his ex-wife would have 
wanted the $200,000.00 to go to him, as the ex-husband, instead of being distributed 
directly to the children. 
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POINT V. PLAINTIFF MAY NOT RELY ON ASSUMPTIONS AND 
SUPPOSITIONS THAT HIS DECEASED EX-WIFE WOULD 
HAVE NAMED HIM AS THE BENEFICIARY ON HER LIFE 
INSURANCE POLICY AFTER THEIR DIVORCE. 
It is well-established that the plaintiff has the burden of proving his claims for 
negligence and breach of contract by a preponderance of the evidence. See Ahlstrom v. 
Salt Lake City Corp.,73 P.3d 315, 317 (Utah 2003); Braddock v. Pacific Woodman Life 
Ass'n, 58 P.2d 765 (Utah 1936). Moreover, Plaintiff has the burden of proving his claims 
fo fraud by clear and convincing evidence. Republic Group, Inc. vs. Won-door Corp., 
883 P.2d 285, 292 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
In this case, discovery has failed to produce evidence that substantiate and prove 
Plaintiffs claims by their respective burdens of proof. Indeed, much or Plaintiffs case 
rests on convincing a jury that an unknown and unidentified Utah County employee told 
him that as long as he paid the premiums for his wife's dependent life insurance policy, 
he would be entitled to the insurance proceeds. Even if Plaintiff could convince a jury 
that this were true, he still rests his case on his self-serving, subjective belief that, had his 
former wife had an opportunity to convert the dependent policy, she would have named 
him, the ex-husband, as the beneficiary of the life insurance policy and given him the 
money instead of naming her children or a third-party trustee as the beneficiary on the life 
insurance policy. Plaintiff assumes, and would have this court to join him in the 
assumption, that "just knowing" Ms. Ellison, she would have named him as the sole 
beneficiary. This is simply not enough evidence to get Plaintiff before a jury in this 
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matter. 
Clearly, Plaintiff fails to establish any evidence that would support Ms. Ellison's 
intent as to whom she would have named as beneficiary in the policy. Thus, his 
allegations of negligence, breach of contract, and fraud would be moot, because he cannot 
prove, as a matter of fact or with any evidentiary support, that following the divorce, Ms. 
Ellison was willing and intended to name him as the beneficiary. Thus, summary 
judgment was timely and warranted in this case. 
POINT VI. PLAINTIFF INAPPROPRIATELY RELIES UPON BARE 
ALLEGATIONS AND IMMATERIAL FACTS. 
Plaintiff claims that it is disputed whether Utah County provided him with a copy 
of the subject policy and that an unidentified, Utah County employee told him that his 
divorce would not affect his wife's life insurance policy. While these facts are disputed, 
they did not foreclose summary judgment for three reasons. First, even if Plaintiff s 
allegations are true, his negligence, fraud and breach of contract claims fail as a matter of 
law, as pointed out above. Second, these facts that Plaintiff claims are disputed are 
nothing more than his bare contentions with absolutely no support in the record. Third, 
the fact that Utah County may or may not have failed to tell Plaintiff about the conversion 
process or give him a copy of the policy is immaterial to the question of law before the 
court. 
Plaintiff alleges that neither party "provided" him with a copy of the Hartford 
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insurance policy. However, it is undisputed that Utah County held a mandatory job fair 
each year, that Tori, a representative of Hartford was at the 2002 fair and that information 
regarding the Hartford life insurance policy was available to Plaintiff at the job fair. The 
fact that Utah County did not make Plaintiff take a copy of the policy, did not send him a 
copy of the new policy, did not call him in and read the policy to him when he got 
divorced or when his ex-wife died is simply immaterial to the question before the court. 
The facts show that the information was available to Plaintiff and he refused to 
adequately research the issue and just let the matter slide. 
Based only upon his own allegations, Plaintiff claims that he was told by some 
Utah County Employee that his divorce would not affect his wife's life insurance policy. 
Even if Utah County had a duty to tell him that he needed to do more than simply pay the 
premiums, Plaintiff can point to no material evidence supporting the occurrence of this 
conversation. "[BJare contentions unsupported by any specification of facts in support 
thereof, raise no material questions of fact as will preclude entry of summary judgment." 
Massev v. Utah Power & Light, 609 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added). 
Plaintiff claims that the fact that he told Linda Daly at Hartford that he spoke with 
a Utah County Employee, tends to prove that he did, yet, he is still relying on a bare 
allegation that he has made. It does not matter that Plaintiff told somebody else that he 
had a conversation with a Utah County Employee, there is still nothing but his own 
statement to indicate that he did have this conversation-which is simply not enough to get 
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before a jury. 
Plaintiff also claims that the fact that he did not take any actions to convert his ex-
wife's policy tends to show that he was told he did not have to do so. Again, this is a 
self-serving and conclusory argument. It is akin to claiming the fact that a diriver failed to 
stop at a stop sign, tends to prove that his statement that he did not see the stop sign is 
true. Plaintiff is inappropriately using the conclusion to prove the facts. There are 
hundreds of explanations to explain why Plaintiff did not convert his ex-wife's policy, the 
most plausible being, that she never would have agreed to make him the beneficiary. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Utah County's Motion for Summary Judgment should be 
granted. To rule otherwise would be contrary to the explicit and unambiguous language 
of the policy contract and adverse to well-established law. 
DATED this Q (J day of October, 2008. 
STRONG & HANNI 
istin A. VanUrman 
Jeremy G. Knight 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees 
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